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In considering the options for 
strengthening the NZBORA, it may 
be helpful to look to the experience of 
Victoria in relation to its somewhat more 
detailed act. However, a comparative 
analysis must consider the broader legal, 
constitutional and political framework 
in which the Victorian Charter operates, 
as well as the different administrative 
arrangements within government that are 
not necessarily apparent from the text. 
constitutional and legal environment
The Victorian Charter operates within 
a very different constitutional and legal 
framework to that of the NZBORA. This 
framework affects the operation of the 
Victoria Charter in a number of ways.
First, the Victorian Charter is 
legislation of the state of Victoria, and can 
therefore generally only apply to Victorian 
legislation and public officials. It cannot 
affect the interpretation of Common-
wealth laws or the implementation of 
those laws by Commonwealth bodies.
Second, the Victorian Charter 
applies differently to the judicial branch 
The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
Act	2006	(the	Victorian	Charter)	was	enacted	16	years	after	
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA). Like the 
NZBORA and the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA), the Victorian Charter is an ordinary act of Parliament 
which seeks to preserve parliamentary sovereignty by limiting 
the courts’ ability to strike down legislation. The Victorian 
Charter drew heavily upon the experience of New Zealand 
and the United Kingdom. The Victorian Charter expressly 
adopts some aspects of the NZBORA and the HRA (such 
as the interpretative rule), rejects other aspects (such as the 
ability to obtain damages for breach), but also includes some 
provisions that are quite different from either the NZBORA 
or the HRA.
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of government. Under the Victorian 
Charter, courts are expressly excluded 
from the definition of ‘public authority’, 
except when acting ‘administratively’. 
In	 contrast,	 section	 6	 of	 the	 HRA	
expressly includes courts and tribunals 
in the definition of public authority and 
provides that it is unlawful for a public 
authority to act incompatibly with a 
human right. Section 3 of the NZBORA 
provides that the act applies to acts done 
by all three branches of government, as 
well as persons and bodies exercising 
public functions, powers and duties. 
The direct application of the NZBORA 
and the HRA to courts and tribunals 
means that courts and tribunals must 
themselves consider human rights and 
act compatibly with them, and renders 
decisions vulnerable to review or appeal 
where they fail to do so. It also potentially 
gives rise to a direct obligation on courts 
to consider and develop the common law 
in light of the statutory human rights. 
Third, from the perspective of a New 
Zealand-qualified lawyer practicing in 
Australian public law, one of the most 
noticeable differences between the 
two legal cultures is the influence of 
the principle of separation of powers. 
In contrast to the position at the 
Commonwealth level, in the Australian 
states there is no strict requirement of 
separation of powers. Nevertheless, the 
principle operates much more strongly in 
the state legal system than it does in New 
Zealand. The principle has already had a 
marked impact upon the interpretation 
and operation of key provisions of the 
Victorian Charter. 
It is clear that the boundaries between 
law-making (a legislative function) 
and interpreting legislation (a judicial 
function) was at the heart of the High 
Court’s decision in Momcilovic v The 
Queen1 to reject the approach adopted by 
the UK courts to the interpretative rule 
in the HRA and to adopt a more modest 
approach to the interpretative rule in 
section 32 of the Victorian Charter. 
Further, for three of the seven members 
of the High Court, the power of a court 
to make a declaration of inconsistent 
interpretation with no practical effect for 
the parties was not a judicial function and 
was incompatible with the institutional 
integrity of the Supreme Court. 
It is also likely that the principle is, at 
least in part, responsible for the courts’ 
reluctance to engage in proportionality 
review, particularly when it comes to 
legislation. Currently, Victoria is in the 
same (or perhaps a worse) position than 
New Zealand was prior to R v Hansen.2 
The conflicting judgments of the High 
Court	in	Momcilovic	mean	that	the	role	of	
the reasonable limits provision in section 
7(2) in an assessment of compatibility 
under the interpretative rule is unclear.
Finally, any consideration of the 
Victorian Charter would also be 
incomplete without acknowledging the 
political environment within which 
it operates. The present coalition 
government opposed the enactment 
of the Victorian Charter when it was 
in opposition. That controversy has 
continued, particularly in the context 
of conducting the statutorily mandated 
reviews of the charter. The Scrutiny 
of Acts and Regulations Committee 
completed the first such review in 
2011. The majority of the committee 
favoured the retention of the provisions 
regarding scrutiny of legislation, and a 
number of significant amendments were 
recommended to improve this process. 
However, a majority also recommended 
the repeal of division 3 (interpretation 
of laws) and division 4 (obligations of 
public authorities).  
Parliamentary scrutiny
One of the obvious differences between 
the provisions of the NZBORA and the 
Victorian Charter is in the obligations to 
report on proposed legislation. Section 
7 of the NZBORA requires the attorney-
general to bring to the attention of 
Parliament any provision of a bill that 
appears to be inconsistent with any of 
the rights and freedoms contained in the 
NZBORA. Notably, the obligation is on 
the attorney-general, including in respect 
of non-government bills, and is only to 
identify inconsistencies with rights. As a 
matter of practice, the attorney-general 
is provided with legal advice on all bills 
by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Justice	 (in	 respect	 of	
non-justice bills) and by the Crown Law 
Office (in respect of justice bills). With the 
exception of advice on bills in respect of 
which a section 7 report has been tabled, 
the legal advice is published online.3
In contrast, section 28 of the Victorian 
Charter places an obligation on the 
member of Parliament who proposes to 
introduce a bill into a house of Parliament 
to cause a reasoned statement of 
compatibility to be prepared in respect of 
the bill. The statement of compatibility is 
laid before the House before the member 
gives his or her second reading speech. 
The Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations 
Committee (a joint investigatory 
committee of Parliament) is required 
by section 30 of the Victorian Charter 
to consider any bill introduced into 
Parliament and to report to Parliament as 
to whether the bill is incompatible with 
human rights. 
The requirement to provide a 
reasoned statement of compatibility in 
respect of all bills is unique to the two 
Australian jurisdictions with a statutory 
human rights instrument, Victoria and 
the Australian Capital Territory. It has the 
potential to improve the understanding 
of all members of Parliament as to the 
human rights implications of proposed 
legislation, and to increase parliamentary 
In contrast, section 28 of the Victorian Charter 
places an obligation on the member of Parliament 
who proposes to introduce a bill into a house 
of Parliament to cause a reasoned statement of 
compatibility to be prepared in respect of the bill.  
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debate of the human rights issues. This is 
more difficult to achieve in jurisdictions 
such as the UK or Canada, where there 
is either no obligation at all upon the 
incumbent government to identify human 
rights issues, or merely a requirement of 
certification that the proposed legislation 
is compatible with human rights. 
In practice, the Victorian Charter 
has not featured prominently in 
parliamentary debates. However, there 
is a clear dialogue between the member 
introducing the bill and the Scrutiny of 
Acts and Regulations Committee. It is 
common for the committee to write to 
the minister introducing a government 
bill identifying further human rights 
issues or requesting more information 
regarding a particular issue, including 
a more detailed justification for an 
identified limit upon rights. In other 
cases the committee may identify issues 
and bring to the attention of Parliament 
the question of whether a particular limit 
upon rights is justified. 
Reasoned statements of compatibility 
may also prove to be an important aspect 
of the dialogue with the courts. As part 
of the extrinsic material, identification in 
the statement of compatibility of whether 
and the extent to which the bill intends to 
limit rights may assist in the subsequent 
interpretation of the legislation. The 
statement of compatibility may also 
provide evidence of the reasons or 
justification for limiting the rights.
Decentralisation and building a culture of 
rights
In enacting the Victorian Charter, it was 
made clear that the expectation was that 
most of the work would occur within 
government, rather than the courts, and 
there was a stated intention to build a 
‘culture of rights’. Key to developing 
that culture was to build knowledge 
throughout government.
Section 28 of the Victorian Charter 
distributes the responsibility for legislative 
compatibility with human rights to all 
members of Parliament, rather than just 
the attorney-general. This decentralisation 
is reinforced and developed through 
the administrative arrangements 
that operate within government. The 
preparation and tabling of a statement 
of compatibility is the culmination of a 
series of administrative processes that are 
aimed at early identification of human 
rights issues and ensuring that proposed 
legislation is developed in a way that is 
compatible with rights. 
In addition to the obligations to 
report in respect of bills under section 
28 of the Victorian Charter, a responsible 
minister is required to provide a human 
rights certificate in respect of legislative 
instruments and statutory rules.4 The 
human rights certificate must certify 
whether rights are limited and, if so, 
whether the limit is reasonable and 
justified. The Scrutiny of Acts and 
Regulations Committee is empowered 
to report to Parliament if the legislative 
instrument is incompatible with the 
human rights in the Victorian Charter.5
Section 38 of the Victorian Charter 
requires that public authorities not only 
act compatibly with rights, but also give 
proper consideration to relevant human 
rights when making decisions. In this 
context, an understanding of human 
rights is required of all public servants.
In contrast to the practice in New 
Zealand, neither the Department of 
Justice nor the Victorian Government 
Solicitor’s Office are responsible for 
preparing statements of compatibility. 
The Victorian Department of Justice has a 
small Human Rights Unit. However, while 
the Human Rights Unit is consulted on 
statements of compatibility and human 
rights certificates, it does not prepare 
them. Departments are encouraged to 
prepare statements of compatibility and 
human rights certificates themselves. 
This is seen as an important aspect of 
building a culture of rights in which all 
public officials develop a knowledge and 
understanding of human rights, and 
consideration of human rights occurs 
at all stages of the decision-making 
processes of government.
There are noticeable benefits of this 
decentralised process. Rather than human 
rights being seen as an area of specialised 
knowledge, possessed only by a select few 
within the Department of Justice or the 
Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office, 
all public servants are encouraged to 
develop a knowledge of human rights 
with particular regard to the implications 
for their policy area. Having legislation 
that is compatible with human rights 
is only the first step in ensuring human 
rights-compatible outcomes. Primary 
legislation may confer a power that, on 
its face, permits a wide discretion, some 
of which may be compatible with rights 
and some of which may not. Ensuring 
subordinate legislation and individual 
decision-making are compatible with 
human rights requires consideration of 
human rights implications at all levels 
of the decision-making process. Building 
knowledge of human rights within all 
areas of government is essential. This was 
recognised by the two-year delay in the 
full operation of the Victorian Charter, 
during which time human rights training 
was implemented government-wide 
and departments had an opportunity 
to develop internal policies and 
procedures to incorporate human rights 
considerations.
In practice, the extent to which 
government departments have built in-
house capacity to prepare statements 
of compatibility and deal with human 
rights issues has been variable. However, 
those departments that encounter human 
rights issues on a regular, and often daily, 
basis have built up significant expertise. 
Those departments generally prepare 
statements of compatibility and human 
rights certificates themselves. Other 
Measuring the success of internal government 
processes is difficult, particularly where it involves 
the development of legislation, as much of the 
material is cabinet-in-confidence.
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departments are more likely to engage 
lawyers to assist; but, even then, they tend 
to have greater engagement in the process 
than occurs in New Zealand, sometimes 
preparing a draft themselves.
Measuring	 the	 success	 of	 internal	
government processes is difficult, 
particularly where it involves the 
development of legislation, as much of 
the material is cabinet-in-confidence. 
The fact that the Victorian Charter is 
being considered and is influencing the 
development of legislation is evident 
from the work of the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission. Often, terms 
of reference will include an express 
requirement to consider the rights 
enshrined in the Victorian Charter. 
Reports of the commission have included 
a	discussion	of	the	charter.	More	recently,	
the commission acknowledged that the 
Victorian Charter proved to be a ‘helpful 
guide’ when designing new guardianship 
laws.
It is also possible to speculate on 
the influence of the Victorian Charter 
by comparing more recent Victorian 
legislation with that in other Australian 
jurisdictions. For example, the Serious Sex 
Offenders (Detention and Supervision) 
Act 2009 includes a range of safeguards 
and protections that are missing from 
similar legislation in other states and 
which reflect rights in the Victorian 
Charter.
Decentralisation comes with a number 
of risks. First, there is the risk of lack of 
consistency across government. That 
risk is increased in a jurisdiction such as 
Victoria, where external legal providers 
play a greater role in the provision of 
legal services than in New Zealand and 
the UK. In Victoria the Human Rights 
Unit within the Department of Justice 
plays an important role in ensuring 
consistency across government. Further, 
the attorney-general is given a significant 
role with respect to litigation involving 
the Victorian Charter. Notice is required 
to be given to the attorney-general where 
issues arise under the Victorian Charter 
in the county or supreme courts, and 
the attorney-general is given a right 
of intervention in any court in which 
issues under the Victorian Charter arise. 
This procedure has been criticised as 
being a deterrent against litigants raising 
human rights issues, and it may also have 
contributed to a perception within the 
legal profession and judiciary that human 
rights issues are particularly complex. 
Nevertheless, the procedure has proven 
to be important to ensuring consistency 
and a whole-of-government approach 
to human rights issues, particularly in 
the early development of jurisprudence 
under the Victorian Charter. 
Second, in a decentralised model such 
as that in Victoria, the role of the Scrutiny 
of Acts and Regulations Committee is 
critical to ensuring a high standard of 
scrutiny of legislation for human rights 
compatibility. The committee acts as an 
independent check on the assessment of 
the internal legislative and policy officers. 
In Victoria the committee is sufficiently 
resourced to have a legal adviser. I can 
say from my own experience within 
government that public servants take 
the committee’s scrutiny seriously. 
They are concerned to ensure that the 
statement of compatibility properly 
identifies and analyses the human rights 
issues and avoids a ‘negative’ report 
from the committee. The presence of 
the committee serves as a powerful 
disincentive against paying lip service to 
human rights or preparing inadequately 
reasoned statements of compatibility.
Express application to all levels of decision-
making
The Victorian Charter is considerably 
more prescriptive than the NZBORA as 
to its application to the different levels 
of decision-making. As in New Zealand, 
the Victorian Charter applies to the 
enactment of primary legislation (through 
sections 28–30) and to its interpretation 
(section 32). The Victorian Charter also 
applies to the making of subordinate 
instruments, through the requirement to 
provide human rights certificates under 
the Subordinate Legislation Act 1994. 
Subordinate instruments are also subject 
to the interpretative rule in section 32 
of the charter.6 However, unlike primary 
legislation, a subordinate instrument that 
is incompatible with human rights may 
result in invalidity, unless the instrument 
is empowered to be incompatible by the 
act under which it is made. A careful 
reading of section 32 of the Victorian 
Charter reveals an operation upon 
subordinate instruments similar to that 
under the NZBORA, according to the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in 
Drew v Attorney-General.7 The potential 
impact of the Victorian Charter on the 
validity of subordinate instruments does 
not seem to be well understood in Victoria 
and, like in New Zealand, the use of the 
interpretative rule to challenge the validity 
of subordinate instruments is rare.
The Victorian Charter expressly 
applies to acts and decisions of public 
authorities. Section 38 provides that it 
shall be unlawful for a public authority 
to act incompatibly with rights or, in 
making a decision, to fail to give proper 
consideration to relevant human rights. 
While public authority is broadly defined, 
the most notable exclusion from the 
definition is courts and tribunals, except 
when acting ‘administratively’.
In contrast, the NZBORA depends 
upon the general application provision 
of section 3 to impose obligations on 
the executive and judicial branches of 
government. In contrast to the UK, there 
The potential impact of the Victorian Charter on 
the validity of subordinate instruments does not 
seem to be well understood in Victoria and, like in 
New Zealand, the use of the interpretative rule to 
challenge the validity of subordinate instruments is 
rare.
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have been relatively few cases in which 
the NZBORA has been used to review 
decisions made by the executive. We can 
only speculate as to the reasons for this, 
but one may be the absence of a clear or 
express provision as to how the NZBORA 
applies to decisions of the executive. 
The focus of much of the New Zealand 
jurisprudence and commentary appears 
to have been on the role of Parliament 
in protecting rights. However, having 
legislation that is compatible with rights 
is only the first step in ensuring rights-
compatible outcomes. Human rights 
need to be considered at all levels of the 
decision-making process.
Exclusion of the courts
As discussed above, the reason courts were 
excluded from the definition of public 
authority is because of the constitutional 
issues that could arise if Victorian courts 
were bound to develop the common law 
by reference to the Victorian Charter. It 
is arguable that, in excluding the courts 
from the definition of public authority, 
the framers of the Victorian Charter 
‘threw the baby out with the bath water’. 
Not only has it meant that courts are 
not required to develop the common 
law; there is no obligation upon them to 
consider the human rights implications 
of their decisions, except in so far as this 
involves interpretation of legislation, or to 
act compatibly with rights. 
There has been a marked reluctance 
on the part of Victorian courts to deal 
with human rights arguments. To a 
large extent this can be explained by 
the lack of clarity as to the operation 
of the interpretative rule in section 32 
of the charter as a consequence of the 
multiple and conflicting judgments of 
the High Court in Momcilovic. However, 
the courts’ reluctance to consider human 
rights arguments has extended to the 
Court of Appeal expressing the view 
that ‘ordinarily this court should not be 
expected to entertain Charter points on 
an interlocutory criminal appeal’.8 
There are sound reasons why 
interlocutory appeals in criminal matters 
may be inappropriate for raising human 
rights arguments. Frequently, such 
appeals raise issues of fair hearing arising 
from a ruling during the course of a trial, 
such as the admissibility of evidence. The 
fairness of a hearing must be assessed 
in light of the conduct of the trial as a 
whole. Accordingly, an argument based 
on the right to a fair hearing in section 24 
of the Victorian Charter is usually inapt 
for an interlocutory appeal. However, 
the Court of Appeal has also cited as 
reasons against considering human rights 
arguments on interlocutory appeals the 
complexity of human rights arguments 
and consequential delay in the criminal 
trial, and, even less convincingly, that 
the matter is capable of being decided in 
favour of the accused without resort to the 
Victorian Charter. Disruption and delay in 
the criminal trial are undoubtedly factors 
to be taken into account in determining 
whether leave should be granted to file 
an interlocutory appeal. They may also 
influence whether the court delivers a 
judgment determining all matters raised 
by the parties, or only those that are 
necessary to dispense with the appeal. 
However, the singling out of human 
rights arguments as being inappropriate 
for raising on an interlocutory appeal is 
problematic, not least because the failure 
to determine those issues may itself be 
incompatible with human rights, as the 
court would be requiring or permitting 
a trial to proceed in breach of human 
rights. Had the judiciary been included 
in the definition of public authority 
(with an exception with respect to the 
common law), as is the case in the UK, 
it would be more difficult for the courts 
to avoid considering and determining 
human rights issues in this way, or more 
generally.
Proper consideration 
The obligation upon public authorities 
to give ‘proper consideration’ to relevant 
human rights in making decisions is unique 
to Victoria and the Australian Capital 
Territory. The procedural obligation is 
consistent with other provisions of the 
Victorian Charter which seek to embed 
human rights within administrative law.9 
This is in distinct contrast to the approach 
of the UK House of Lords, which has 
rejected process review under the HRA. 
As Baroness Hale stated in Belfast City 
Council v Miss Behavin’ Ltd:
The role of the court in human rights 
adjudication is quite different from 
the role of the court in an ordinary 
judicial review of administrative 
action. In human rights adjudication, 
the court is concerned with whether 
the human rights of the claimant 
have in fact been infringed, not with 
whether the administrative decision-
maker properly took them into 
account.10
Tom Hickman is critical of the 
complete rejection of process review 
under the HRA, particularly given the 
importance of a procedural obligation 
to the development of a culture of rights 
(Hickman, 2010, ch.8). He argues that 
both commentators and the House of 
Lords overreached with their concerns 
that process review would lead to a 
‘new formalism’ and be ‘a recipe for 
judicialisation on an unprecedented 
scale’,11 and that ‘a construction … 
which requires ordinary citizens in local 
government to produce such formulaic 
incantations would make it ridiculous’.12
In Victoria, the obligation in section 
38 to give proper consideration to 
relevant human rights has so far been 
interpreted in a way that addresses 
the concerns expressed by the House 
of Lords. In Castles v Secretary to the 
In Victoria, the obligation in section 38 to give 
proper consideration to relevant human rights has 
so far been interpreted in a way that addresses the 
concerns expressed by the House of Lords.
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Department of Justice,13 a prisoner sought 
declaratory relief to enable her to resume 
the IVF treatment she underwent prior to 
her incarceration. The judge recognised 
the potential for section 38 to apply to 
a wide range of decisions at all levels 
of government. In light of that, ‘proper 
consideration of human rights should 
not be a sophisticated legal exercise’: 
Proper consideration need not 
involve formally identifying the 
‘correct’ rights or explaining 
their content by reference to legal 
principles or jurisprudence. Rather, 
proper consideration will involve 
understanding in general terms 
which of the rights of the person 
affected by the decision may be 
relevant and whether, and if so how, 
those rights will be interfered with 
by the decision that is made. As 
part of the exercise of justification, 
proper consideration will involve 
balancing competing private and 
public interests. There is no formula 
for such an exercise, and it should 
not be scrutinised over-zealously by 
the courts.14
Her Honour concluded that while 
‘proper consideration’ entails that the 
public authority must do more than 
simply pay lip service to Victorian Charter 
rights and the terms of section 7, it does 
not require a comprehensive or detailed 
analysis:
While I accept that the requirement 
in s 38(1) to give proper 
consideration to a relevant human 
right requires a decision-maker to do 
more than merely invoke the Charter 
like a mantra, it will be sufficient 
in most circumstances that there 
is some evidence that shows the 
decision-maker seriously turned his 
or her mind to the possible impact 
of the decision on a person’s human 
rights and the implications thereof 
for the affected person, and that the 
countervailing interests or obligations 
were identified.15
In that case, the detailed manner 
in	 which	 the	 competing	 interests	 of	 Ms	
Castles and the broader public interests 
were weighed up in briefings, together 
with the secretary’s own statement, was 
considered sufficient.
In Patrick’s Case,16 Justice Bell agreed 
with the comments of the court in 
Castles and reinforced the view that the 
consideration of human rights required 
by section 38 can be done in a variety of 
ways to suit the particular circumstances. 
Referring to UK authority, Bell noted 
that decision-makers ‘are not expected to 
approach the application of human rights 
like a judge “with textbooks on human 
rights at their elbows”’.17 
In Victoria, another issue has 
arisen which raises concerns about the 
implications of the procedural obligation 
upon public authorities. That is the 
question of appropriate remedies for 
breach of the obligation. Australian 
administrative law retains the concept of 
jurisdictional error that has largely been 
abandoned in New Zealand. At the risk of 
oversimplifying the position, jurisdictional 
error can render a decision invalid, the 
remedy for which would normally be to 
quash the decision. In the area of human 
rights, even breach of the substantive 
obligation to act compatibly with human 
rights will often result in declaratory 
relief only. Where the procedural 
obligation is not complied with but the 
ultimate outcome is compatible with 
human rights, it seems difficult to justify 
an approach that invalidates and quashes 
the decision. The Supreme Court has so 
far rejected the argument that a breach 
of section 38 of the Victorian Charter 
amounts to jurisdictional error, but that 
decision is on appeal.18
On the other hand, the ability to 
review a decision for proper consideration 
of human rights may avoid the criticism 
commonly leveled against statutory 
bills of rights, namely that they involve 
unwarranted intrusion of the courts into 
the role of the executive by reviewing 
decisions on their merits. While I do not 
subscribe to the view that proportionality 
review amounts to merits review, it 
nevertheless involves greater scrutiny 
of decisions than permitted under 
Wednesbury unreasonableness. There may 
be occasions when it is more appropriate 
for a court to quash the decision, or to 
make a declaration that would have the 
effect of requiring the public authority 
to re-make its decision, giving proper 
consideration to human rights, rather 
than for the court to determine what is 
the correct and human rights-compatible 
outcome. 
In New Zealand, the question of the 
availability of process review under the 
NZBORA has yet to be fully considered 
by the courts. Arguably, it remains open 
to the New Zealand courts to permit 
some degree of process review under 
the NZBORA, perhaps following the 
Canadian approach19 rather than that of 
the UK.
If a procedural obligation were to be 
added into the NZBORA, consideration 
should be given to how the obligation 
might relate to any substantive obligation 
to act compatibly with rights, and to the 
remedies that may flow from a breach.
substantive rights
The Victorian Charter includes a broader 
range of rights than the NZBORA. These 
include rights which go well beyond the 
If a procedural obligation were to be added into 
the NZBORA, consideration should be given to 
how the obligation might relate to any substantive 
obligation to act compatibly with rights, and to the 
remedies that may flow from a breach.
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criminal law, including the right to equality 
(section 8), the right to privacy (section 
13), the rights of families and children 
(section 17) and cultural rights (section 
19). The consequence is that the Victorian 
Charter has not been limited to criminal 
matters and has not been branded with 
being a ‘drink driver’s charter’ or anything 
similar. The fact that the Victorian Charter 
can only apply to state legislation, as noted 
above, means that some of the most 
controversial issues, such as anti-terrorism 
laws and treatment of asylum seekers, 
have not been affected by it. Rather, the 
cases in which the Victorian Charter has 
received the most judicial attention have 
included issues such as the treatment of 
persons with mental illness in the criminal 
justice system,20 the rights of families and 
children in public housing,21 the rights of 
persons with disabilities in guardianship 
matters,22 the rights of persons 
involuntarily detained under mental 
health legislation,23 and the rights of 
children in the care of the state.24 The 
inclusion of such rights ensure that the 
Victorian Charter is relevant to all 
Victorians, not just those who come into 
contact with the criminal justice system.
conclusion
In many respects the open text of the 
NZBORA may not need amendment to 
strengthen its protection of human rights. 
It is open to government to strengthen 
administrative and parliamentary 
procedures, without amendment to the 
act. It is also open to the New Zealand 
courts to develop a form of process review 
and/or review for substantive compliance 
with rights, and to take a more active role 
in ensuring compliance with rights.
However, without incorporating 
new rights that are relevant to all New 
Zealanders, the NZBORA may continue 
to be seen as a drink-drivers’ or criminals’ 
charter. While Victoria’s charter may be 
politically controversial, the fact that its 
most significant impacts have been in 
areas such as mental health and child 
protection enables it to have much 
broader support within the community.
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